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ments or gifts to government officials have higher levels of firm performance. 
The hypothesis is empirically analyzed by using a recent dataset provided by the 
World Bank Enterprise Survey conducted in 2011-2013. The empirical results 
from this study suggest that firms that perceive the court system to be corrupted 
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formance. This implies that corruption does not contribute negatively to Chi-
nese firm growth at all. 
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Chapter 1  
Introduction 
 
 
 
  
The relationship between corruption and economic growth has been a widely 
studied phenomenon in literature. Corruption is believed to be one the most 
common obstacle to economic growth according to development experts. Cor-
ruption is especially a well observed phenomenon in countries with low eco-
nomic growth. Many scholars have tried to analyse the relationship between cor-
ruption and growth by describing the various issues in the macroeconomics of 
misgovernance (Ehrlich and Lui, 1999; Sarte, 2000). An abundant amount of 
evidence suggests that corruption directly hinders economic growth, and there-
fore suggests a purely negative relationship between corruption and economic 
growth (Keefer and Knack, 1997; Knack and Keefer, 1995; Li et al., 2000). How-
ever, a smaller body of literature argues that corruption may have a beneficial 
effect on economic development as it greases the wheels of commerce, which is 
quite puzzling (Leff, 1964; Bayley, 1966; Huntington, 1968; Lui, 1985; Becquart-
Leclercq, 1989). 
The spread of corruption may differ considerably across countries. In a 
study by Neeman et al. (2008), evidence suggests that only countries with a high 
degree of financial openness suffer from corruption as a hindrance of economic 
growth. On the contrary, in countries that are less financially integrated, the neg-
ative relationship almost disappears. Méndez and Sépúlveda (2006) find that cor-
ruption benefits growth at low levels of economic development, but becomes 
harmful to growth when the economy develops to a higher level. Corruption 
may restrict economic growth to a lesser of greater degree when accounting for 
other various economic and social factors.  
Moreover, Studies of Campos et al. (1999) and Rock and Bonnett (2004) 
find that corruption has less negative impact on investment when it is organized 
as it is less uncertain and thus more predictable. Furthermore, the negative rela-
tionship between corruption and investment only occurs in small developing 
economies, but shows a positive correlation in the newly industrialised econo-
mies such as China. Previous empirical evidence that aliens with this reasoning 
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suggests that not all economies with extensive corruption have suffered from 
poor growth rates. Wedeman (2002) finds that many countries in the “East Asian 
paradox” such as China, South Korea, Thailand and Indonesia have coped well 
with corruption. China, as one of the “East Asian paradox” countries, has wit-
nessed exceptional growth rates despite of high levels of corruption. On the 
recent ranking of the Transparency Index (2016), China ranks as the 79th least 
corrupt country out of 175 countries. China averages 68.32 from 1995 until 
2016, reaching its highest rank of 100 in 2014 and its lowest rank of 40 in 1995. 
It is expected that China will rank 82 at the end of this quarter (Trading Eco-
nomics, 2017). The long-term perspective is that China will even reach rank 90 
in 2020. Accordingly, corruption seems to be less damaging to economic growth 
in the “East Asian paradox” countries, with China being the most compelling 
example. China has been one of the fastest growing economies since the reforms 
started in the early 1980s. China’s economy has even reached a peak average 
annual growth rate of 10 per cent (Wang and You, 2012). However, despite these 
remarkably growth rates, corruption remains to thrive along with economic and 
social reforms. It is therefore quite interesting to ask: why does corruption not 
hinder economic growth in China? This paper seeks to provide a clarification 
for this puzzle from a micro-level point of view. In particular, this paper analyses 
the relationship between corruption and Chinese firm growth. 
Existing literature has paid extensive attention to the nature and extent 
of corruption, yet to my knowledge there is a relative scarcity of empirical studies 
on corruption and growth in China. In particular, there is a lack of literature 
examining the effect of corruption on the growth performance of Chinese firms. 
This scarcity is mainly due to the lack of empirical data. Though, over the past 
years several country studies on macro-level have had China in their sample. 
However, Fisman and Svensson (2007) rightfully argue that cross country anal-
ysis is an inadequate way to get relevant information about the impact of cor-
ruption on firm level growth. By relying on aggregate macroeconomic statistics, 
it withholds scholars of analysing possible variations of corruption in a country 
nor does it allow to identify factors that influence firm performance.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Chapter 2 provides 
an overview of the main theories and hypothesis related to the research of the 
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relationship between corruption and firm performance of Chinese firms. Chap-
ter 3 provides an overview of the existing literature on the topic and country 
specific background on the deep rooted existence of corruption and the battle 
China has with corruption. Chapter 4 describes the data that is collected and 
used in this study. Chapter 5 describes the methodology and model specifica-
tions. Chapter 6 presents the results of the regressions of the estimated models. 
Chapter 7 discusses the results and implications more in depth. Lastly, chapter 
8 provides the final conclusions, limitations and recommendations for future 
studies. 
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Chapter 2  
Theory and Hypothesis 
 
 
 
2.1 Theoretical context 
 
China is a country that succeeded in an environment of weak institutions and 
lacking enforcement of regulations, which led to a rather productive business 
environment. Yuen Yuen Ang (2016) discussed in his book that “The first step of 
development is always to build markets with weak institutions,” meaning that it may ap-
pear to look corrupt or it may seem that you are doing business with wrong types 
of practices but at the end it is all about making the best use of the already es-
tablished institutions in order to stimulate market activities. China has been 
searching for ways to restart their economy since the early 80s. The most ex-
traordinary method is the Chinese government directing their bureaucrats to use 
their personal network in order to attract (foreign) investors for projects. Com-
pared to western standards this may strike as a corrupt system because the bu-
reaucrats basically have been given a “card blanch” to look for investors. However, 
this system is rather based on a voluntary agreement between the two involved 
parties either in the form of a monetary transaction or in terms of an undefined 
reciprocation, which in the end is beneficial for both parties.  
Historically, China has witnessed the fastest economic growth than any 
other country in the world. Root of this development was partly due to China’s 
under-regulated business environment. This under-regulated business environ-
ment was characterized by its emphasis on networks and social connections 
sweetened by monetary incentives. Another factor that contributed to China’s 
success is their negligence of following the rules affirmed by more developed 
countries. Emerging economies, such as China, often find themselves in a com-
promising position when it comes to what to establish first, get rich fast or es-
tablish solid formal institutions. In China’s case, many believe it chose to get rich 
fast first. This approach has been beneficial to China’s economic growth over 
the last three decades. However, China has reached a more developed stage with 
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mature markets and now faces the consequences of the double-edged sword 
since the corrupt practises have a deteriorating effect on the Chinese economy 
(Shepard, 2016).  
 
2.2 Theoretical background and empirical evidence 
 
2.2.1 Definition of corruption and bribery 
 
Corruption and bribery are often used as interchangeable terms within literature. 
Transparency International (2017) defines corruption as “the abuse of entrusted 
power for private gain”. Three types of corruption are recognized, namely grand, 
petty and political corruption. Grand corruption refers to operations committed 
at a high level of government that alter policies or the functioning of the state. 
It enables officials to profit at the expense of the public good. Bribery is consid-
ered to be a direct measurement of corruption (Fisman and Svensson, 2007). 
This thesis adopts the following definition for bribery: “The offering, promising, giv-
ing, accepting or soliciting of an advantage as an inducement for an action which is illegal, 
unethical or a breach of trust. Inducements can take the form of gifts, loans, fees, rewards or 
other advantages” (Transparency International, 2017). Since bribery is considered 
to be the most important, resilient and damaging form of corruption (Guo, 
2008), bribery will be the main focus in this thesis. For simplicity reasons, “cor-
ruption” is often used interchangeably with “bribery” unless stated otherwise in 
the text.  
 
2.2.2 Rent-seeking theory 
 
Several studies, conducted on a macro-level, have presented evidence on the 
impact bribery has on economic development and growth (Ades and Di Tella, 
1997, 1999; Brown, 2006; Hellman et al., 2000; La Porta et al., 1997, 1999; 
Mauro, 1995; Persson et al., 2003; Treisman, 2000; Wei, 1997). There are various 
theories that explain corruption. One compelling theory that is universally 
viewed as the main explanatory theory of the phenomenon of corruption is the 
rent-seeking theory, which is developed by Gordon Tullock and others in the 
1970s. This theory treats corruption as a specific rent-seeking activity and views 
bribery as a mean which is offered by firms to government officials in order to 
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gain preferential treatments (Rose-Ackerman, 1999). The main cause of bribery 
is believed to be due to government intervention in economic activities (Bu-
chanan 1980; Manion 2004). Emerging economies that have high levels of po-
litical intervention in terms of licenses, permits and quotas suffer from scarcity. 
This scarcity indicates that there is possibility that rent-seeking activity such as 
bribery occurs. Since Chinese government officials determine the allocation of 
resources, many misuse that opportunity to extort bribes (Shabbir and Anwar, 
2007). Furthermore, most often firms tend to find that bribery is the only way 
to benefit their firm since they gain prevalence from government officials. Ngo 
(2008) concludes that rent-seeking is believed to be the most common source of 
corruption nowadays in China since firms bribe in exchange for rents such as 
economic gain in the form of subsidies or tariff protection. Ngo (2008) further 
argues that a vast majority of rent-seeking activities bear directly on the predom-
inance of bribery in China. Firms are considered to be rational actors, particularly 
when it comes to the decision to engage in bribery. As the Neo-classical eco-
nomic theory suggests, rational actors base their decisions within a benefit-cost 
framework (Michaels and Miethe, 1989). A firm will make the decision to bribe 
a government official when it benefits their firm performance to such an extent 
that without the bribe the firm will lose out on eminent resources. Gao (2010) 
provides evidence that there is a positive relationship between firm’s perceived 
benefit and its attitude towards bribery. He argues that given the cost of bribery, 
firms inclination to bribe increases when the perceived benefit increases. 
 On the other side, literature also provides various explanations as to why 
government officials bribe. Relative low salaries for government officials have 
been argued to be a cause of corruption in developing countries such as China 
(Quah, 2005). Economic liberalization of the incomes of new private businesses 
have increased immensely, yet the salaries of government officials stayed behind. 
The income gap and the growth of living cost over the past decades creates 
incentives for government officials to engage in rent-seeking activities such as 
bribery to compensate for the lack of income (White, 1996).  
 
 
 
 
	
	
	
12	
2.2.3 Moral theory 
 
Apart from the rent-seeking theory, scholars agree upon two other competing 
theories that conceptualize the interaction between bribery and firm perfor-
mance more specifically. The first theory covers the rather dominant moral the-
orisation, meaning that bribery has a negative interfering impact on firm perfor-
mance due to rent seeking, misallocation of resources, and inefficient invest-
ments.  
Previous macro-level studies already provided compelling evidence on 
the negative effect corruption has on growth (Donadelli and Persha, 2014; Doh 
et al., 2003; Faruq and Webb, 2013; Frye and Shleifer, 1997; Gray et al., 2004; 
Knack and Keefer, 1995; Mauro, 1995; Rodrik et al., 2002; Wieneke and Gries, 
2011). Myrdal (1968) argues that corrupted government officials can purpose-
fully delay permits etc. that would otherwise not happen in order to extract a 
bribe. The effect of this is that overall costs on aggregate and firm level increases 
which negatively affects firm performance. Fisman and Svensson (2007) con-
ducted research and found that a one percentage point increase in bribes is re-
lated to a decline of firm growth by three percentage points. Other empirical 
evidence provided by Djankove et al., (2002) confirms this result. In their study 
they argue that high levels of bribery results in high costs for businesses such as 
transaction costs and therefore limits firm performance. Literature regards brib-
ery not as rational strategic choice to benefit firm performance, but as a com-
pulsory “tax” set by rapacious government officials who operate in a weak insti-
tutional environment (Fisman and Svensson, 2007). As a result, firms who also 
operate in this poor environment feel pressured by this involuntary tax. This 
type of bribery affects firms’ financial resources negatively and hinders firm 
growth (Mauro, 1995; Wei, 2000).  
 
2.2.4 Grease the wheels 
 
On the other side, bribery is often theorised as the driving factor of commerce. 
This theory suggests that engaging in bribery may enable firms to avoid red tape 
and bureaucratic obstacles and therefore having a positive effect on firm perfor-
mance (Acemoglu and Verdier, 2000; Meon and Weill, 2010; De Vaal and Eb-
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ben, 2011). Thus, this theory suggests that corruption improves firm perfor-
mance rather than harming it. Kaufmann and Wei (1999) discuss the “efficient 
grease” hypothesis more in depth. They argue that corruption is an efficient 
method to reduce bureaucratic burdens which results in economic growth. The 
“grease the wheels” hypothesis accepts the fact that some “grease” money is 
necessary to overcome any distortions due to inefficiencies caused by bureau-
cratic burdens and red tape (Williams et al., 2016). Another argument that pre-
sumes the positive contribution of bribery is that bribes may enhance the estab-
lishment of beneficial relationships with government officials. This theory em-
phasises on the fact that organizations and individuals engage in corruption to 
maximize their interests (Misangyi et al., 2008). Above all, the theory suggests 
that the engagement in corruption is a rational response to inefficient bureau-
cracies (DeSoto, 2000). 
Empirical evidence on the positive relationship between bribery and firm 
performance maintains to be limited since some scholars only find insignificant 
or negative effects (Gaviria, 2002). However, in a recent study Ayaydin and 
Hayaloglu (2014), they analysed the relationship between bribery and firm per-
formance in Turkey. In a sample of 41 Turkish manufacturing firms they found 
that there is indeed a positive relationship because “grease money” avoids bu-
reaucratic burdens. This is one of the few studies that confirms the positive re-
lationship between bribery and firm performance. When it comes to China, al-
most no studies have been conducted on the relationship between bribery and 
firm performance of Chinese firms. Wang and You (2012) are one of the few 
that conducted research about the impact of bribery on firm performance in 
China. Their study uses the Investment Climate Survey which is conducted by 
the National Bureau Statistics of China in 2005. The survey consists of 12,400 
firms located in 20 different Chinese provinces. The study found a positive re-
lationship between bribery and the growth rates of Chinese firms. They also 
found evidence that well-functioning institutions such as the financial market is 
detrimental to a firm’s growth rate. However, since then no studies have been 
conducted that include Chinese firms in the dataset. To fill this gap, a recent data 
set is employed to test the following proposition. 
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H1. Given China’s high corruption levels, Chinese firms that engage in 
bribery in the form of payments or gifts to public officials have improved firm 
performances.  
 
2.3 Why do firms engage in bribery? 
 
Bribery involves an illegitimate transaction between government officials and 
other actors. In this paper the emphasis is on the relationship between govern-
ment officials and firms who give the bribes. It is therefore important to under-
stand the role and motives of Chinese government officials and to recognize that 
firms are part of the problem too. As discussed, it is beneficial for Chinese gov-
ernment officials to engage is bribery as they receive monetary incentives to 
compensate for their relative low income. Firms, however, base their decision 
to engage in bribery on a benefit-cost analysis while considering the advantages 
and disadvantages.  
 
2.3.1 Advantages 
 
Why do firms bribe? There are four main advantages for firms when it comes to 
bribing government officials. The first advantage refers to the strong relation-
ship one builds with government officials. This relationship may help eliminating 
constraints that comes with bureaucratic hurdles (de Jong et al., 2012). Kasuga 
(2013), finds in his research that bribery has a positive effect on firm productivity 
due to reduces bureaucratic impediments as a result of preferential treatment. 
Secondly, Meon and Weill (2010) argue that corruption might increase aggregate 
efficiency when a firm is dealing with weak institutions. In particular, weak in-
stitutions are one of the main reasons as to why governments maintain control 
over resources such as finance and raw material. This implies that firms operat-
ing in such economies are very dependent on governments due to their reliance 
on those vital resources (Baron, 1995; Zhou and Peng, 2011). Third, firms be-
lieve they gain access to manipulating markets, wining contracts and favourable 
treatment if they bribe government officials. Fishman (2001), finds in his re-
search strong links between bribing government officials and higher market val-
ues for firms in Indonesia. Lastly, based on a survey conducted by Charney and 
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Qazi (2015), firms bribe to keep up with the competition. By paying bribes, firms 
aim to gain a larger market share which benefits their revenues. 
 
2.3.2 Disadvantages 
 
Countries that have weak institutions may suffer from the indirect costs of brib-
ery compared to countries with advanced institutions, since the latter has an el-
evated importance in transparency and accountability. There are three important 
indirect costs related to bribery, namely: social penalties, competitive disad-
vantages and misallocation of resources. Social penalties occur from divergent 
socially accepted behaviour. Fisman and Miguel (2007) argue that as institutions 
become stronger, bribery becomes a less accepted way as a business norm. The 
effect of this is that the social penalties are related with an unreliable reputation, 
loss of trust and estrangement from social and business networks. This will even-
tually result in bad firm performance (Luo, 2002; Lambsdorff, 2008; Nichols, 
2008). Second, firms that operate in an environment of weak institutions and 
therefore bribe, compete with non-bribing firms that have sufficient access to 
resources and are less dependent on government relations. This means that the 
predominance of bribery as way of conducting business declines. The bribing 
firms lose their competitive position due to their heavy dependence on govern-
ment relations and resources. This results in lowered likelihood of profitability 
in more advanced institutional environments (Doh et al., 2003). Lastly, accord-
ing to Murphy et al., (1993) bribing leads to an inefficient allocation of human 
capital and resources from production to rent-seeking. Particularly, bribing dis-
turbs investment to innovation, marketing and limits the capability of firms to 
further develop and innovate (de Jong et al., 2012). As a result, corruption 
evolves into a growing risk and a disadvantage for firms (Luo, 2002).   
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Chapter 3  
Literature Review and background 
 
 
 
3.1 China and its battle with corruption 
 
Corruption is considered to be one of the most extensive impediments to eco-
nomic growth, firm growth and social development. After investigating a con-
siderable amount of studies regarding this relationship, it becomes clear that in 
general countries with bad economic performances tend to experience high lev-
els of corruption (Wang and You, 2012). A striking fact about corruption is that 
no matter what kind of measurement you use; it is consistently higher in poor 
countries. According to the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions 
Index (2016), the 10 least corrupt countries have an average GDP per capita of 
approximately $36,700, while the 10 most corrupt countries have an average 
GPD per capita of approximately $5,000. However, there is compelling evidence 
that contradicts this assumption. It appears that not all countries have endured 
the negatives of corruption. One of the most conspicuous examples serve as a 
basis of the “East Asian paradox”. A few countries in the East Asian region, 
such as China, have experienced extraordinary double-digit growth rates alt-
hough suffering from high corruption levels.1 A possible explanation is that cor-
ruption appears to have a positive relationship with growth in newly industrial-
ised economies such as China compared to small developing countries (Wede-
man, 2002). 
There are several events that were essential for comprehending China’s 
remarkable economic growth over the last two decades. China initiated a set of 
economic reforms in 1978 under Deng Xiaoping, which transitioned the country 
from a central planned economy to a market-led economy. China opened up the 
country which encouraged international trade and major FDI inflows. As a re-
sult, China is considered to be one of the most rapidly growing economies of 
the world. Another important event is the implementation of the company law 
                                                
1	Other countries that are included in the “East Asian paradox” are South Korea, Thai-
land and Indonesia	
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in 1993 and the revision in 2005 were key. This law enabled, especially foreign 
investors, to set up limited liability companies and joint stock companies. Few 
years after the introduction of the company law, China joined the World Trade 
Organization (WTO). The entering of China to the WTO in 2001 signified its 
complete integration into the world economy. Six years later, China imple-
mented the property rights law in 2007 which established laws that regulates 
ownership and property rights protection. These reforms combined led to an 
impressive expansion of firms that got registered in China. Today, there are over 
77,469,000 registered companies in China, active in different sectors ranging 
from heavy industry to light industry (Dickinson, 2007).  
 
3.1.1 Anti-corruption campaign 
 
Despite the economic growth, China’s high levels of corruption overshadow 
their economic success. Xi Jinping took China’s leadership in 2012 during the 
18th National Congress. Xi emphasized on the crackdown of corruption by im-
plementing various policies. In spite of president’s Xi Ping’s anti-corruption 
campaign “catching tigers and flies”, China’s ranking remains 79 out of 176 on the 
Transparency International Index (2016) and scores 40 out of 100 where 0 indi-
cates highly corrupted and 100 least corrupt. It even seems that China has be-
come more corrupt over the years (Figure 3 and 4). Though, since the start of 
the anti-corruption campaign over 300.000 government officials were punished 
last year on top of the already punished 400.000 in previous years. While in the 
early 80s the same government officials were encouraged to use their personal 
relations to attract investors for projects, now this could cost you your job or 
even jail time. Xi’s efforts to fight corruption seems to be more of a downstream 
fight rather than fighting the upstream institutional causes. It is easier and 
quicker to punish government officials than reforming a whole bureaucracy and 
building strong institutions. The effect of the policy goes even further than not 
being able to receive or give gifts, it disturbed fundamental ways of the func-
tioning of local governments. Chinese government officials seemed no longer to 
know how to approach their work. No official wants to make an important de-
cision due to the fear of being accused as corrupt. Instead of having this system 
where officials use their relations to get investors, there is a new decision making 
committee involved in allocating projects. This means that businesses inside and 
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outside of China are dealing with a slower system that comes with more regula-
tions. The overall result of Xi Ping’s anti-corruption campaign is a less dynamic 
economy and hampered development (Shepard, 2016). 
 
3.2 Bribery as a strategy: Guanxi 
 
Why is corruption such a big problem in China? Giving gifts or grease money is 
a custom in China since it is considered to be part of a larger picture. By giving 
money or gifts you belong to a particular network of personal relationships 
known as guanxi (Steidlmeier, 1999). Whether these relations are considered to 
be right is truly a matter of moral and practical concern. Bribery in China basi-
cally takes two strategy forms, either as an active strategy or as a passive strategy. 
These strategies are a way of dealing with the challenges faced by Chinese firms 
due to the changing economic and business environments. Guanxi is mainly de-
scribed as the close and long-term business relationship between businessmen 
who lean on the principle of resource exchanges (Yeung and Tung, 1996). 
Guanxi is a phenomenon that is deeply rooted in Chinese society and business 
environment (Luo and Chen 1996; Park and Luo 2001; Xin and Pearce 1996). 
In order to enter the Chinese business market, one first needs to enter the huge 
network of guanxi (Su and Littlefield, 2001). Guanxi originates from the long-
standing Confucian heritage which is based on the principles of hierarchy, rela-
tions and corporation (Hwang, 1987). However, the development of such guanxi 
networks has risen on the back of the economic reforms such as the opening-
up reforms late in the 1970s (Seligman, 1999). China’s opening-up policy and its 
transition to a marked-based economy have led to important obstacles for Chi-
nese firms since they are operating in a different business environment. In order 
to maintain their competitive advantages, many firms find themselves in a posi-
tion compelled to take matters into own hands by paying bribes and relying more 
on the guanxi web (Huang and Rice, 2012). Being part of guanxi-based networks 
remains to be a vital condition for doing business in China. This suggests that 
the way guanxi is anchored in the Chinese culture means that many Chinese 
businesses do not recognize corruption and bribery as much as Westerners 
would. A sales manager from a telecom company in Harbin China said: “It’s an 
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unspoken rule” (Charney and Qazi, 2015). This statement confirms the perception 
about corruption that prevails in China. 
 
3.2.1 Opening-up reforms and bribery 
 
The opening-up reforms and the transition to a more market-based economy in 
the late 1970s included revolutionary macro-economic changes such as the less-
ening of central control by the government. Reforms on micro-economic level 
included privatization of state-owned enterprises, the attraction of Foreign Di-
rect Investments (FDI) and the stimulus of international trade (Dunfee and War-
ren, 2001). The reforms introduced by Deng Xiaoping contributed intensively 
to China’s extraordinary economic growth over the past decades (Hung 2008). 
The reforms have had far-reaching consequences, especially from a micro-eco-
nomic perspective. Openness and free flow of information have been key as-
pects in the reforms. The free flow of information has been catalysed by the 
growth of internet and telecommunication, making China an interesting country 
to conduct business with (Dunfee and Warren, 2001).  
Despite the great opportunities that emerged, the reforms have inescap-
ably caused for many challenges. Huang and Rice (2012) developed a conceptual 
framework that shows the opportunities and challenges associated with the re-
forms introduced that incline firms to engage in bribery-related activities (Figure 
1). These strategies are either employed as an active measure to maintain re-
source-stock rarity, or as a passive defence against different bureaucratic ineffi-
ciencies and institutional weaknesses.  
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Figure 1: Theoretical framework  
 
 
Source: Huang and Rice (2012) 
 
The opening-up of Chinese markets and economy have opened the door to 
more competitive pressures, not only globally but also internally. Moreover, the 
lessening of the control of the Chinese government and the privatization of 
many State-Owned Enterprises have shifted responsibility from the govern-
ment. This led to reallocation and increased competiveness for resources. The 
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greater openness is believed to implicitly lead to more pressure on senior man-
agement decision making to establish sustainable competitive arrangements 
(Huang and Rice, 2012). The consequence is that managements seek relational 
advantages through actively participating in bribery. In addition, the inefficient 
Chinese public sector which is characterized by red tape and time-consuming 
processes have appeared to be even more problematic in transitional China than 
initially expected (Xin and Pearce, 1996; Dunfee and Warren, 2001). Due to 
these greater bureaucratic inefficiencies firms passively use their network to get 
things done by engaging in bribery as shown in the conceptual framework 
(Bardhan, 1997). 
 
3.3 China in national and international perspective  
 
Previous research presents evidence that corruption tends to be clustered in 
neighboured areas (You and Nie, 2017). Figure 2 shows that Chinese provinces 
in the East are 10 per cent less corrupt than provinces in the west. This is in line 
with the findings of Wei (2000), as he argues that more open regions in terms of 
economy size and geographic locations as is the case in East-China, better facil-
itate resources to establish stronger institutions and governance and therefore, 
deal with lower levels of corruption.  
 
Figure 2: Geographic distribution of corruption 
Source: You and Nie (2017) 
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Each year Transparency International publishes the Corruption Perception In-
dex which indicates what the “corruption” ranking is of the 176 countries that 
are included in the index. Figure 3 shows the Corruption Perceptions Index for 
China. According to this index China averages 33.99 points from 1995 until 
2016, reaching a peak of 40 points in 2013 and 21.60 points in 1995.2 Further-
more, the graph shows a clear upward trend line. It is interesting to observe that 
China has been battling corruption since 1995 and maybe even earlier despite 
China’s efforts and reforms to eliminate corruption. However, there seems to 
be a downward trend around 2012 until 2014 when the anti-corruption cam-
paign started. Despite the campaign, the long-term effects are limited since there 
is an upward trend noticeable staring in 2014.  
 
Figure 3: China corruption index 1995-2016 
 
Source: Trading Economics (2017) 
 
A particular concern is that China remains to score low when it comes to cor-
ruption compared to other countries. Another country that has witnessed great 
economic growth over the past decades is Russia. Table 1 (Appendix A) presents 
the ranking for China and Russia. Both countries have grown rapidly over the 
past decades whilst much of the world was battling the financial crisis and there-
fore witnessed no growth. China’s and Russia’s impressive growth does have 
implications that reach far beyond their own economies due to their interna-
tional trade and investments. The Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) flows to 
both countries was around US$120 Billion in 2010, this is five times more the 
                                                
2 With 0 being highly corrupt and 100 being very clean. 
	
	
	
23	
value of FDI from Brazil and India (Transparency International, 2011). Thus, 
not only domestic businesses battle corruption, international businesses are also 
bound to be exposed to corrupt practices, which make corruption not only a 
“Chinese” problem but also a global problem. 
 
Figure 4: China corruption rank 1995-2016 and forecast 2016-2020 
 
Source: Trading Economics (2017) 
 
Figure 4 shows China’s corruption ranking from 1995-2016. China ranks as the 
79th least corrupt country out of 175 countries according to the Corruption Per-
ceptions Index (2016). China averages 68.32 from 1995 until 2016, reaching its 
highest rank of 100 in 2014 and its lowest rank of 40 in 1995. It is expected that 
China will rank 82 at the end of this quarter, based on global macro models of 
Trading Economics. The long-term perspective is that China will even reach 
rank 90 in 2020. Transparency International argues that lower-ranked countries 
such as China and Russia, are afflicted by untrustworthy and poor functioning 
public institutions. Even though these countries have anti-corruption laws in 
place, in reality those laws are often ignored and/or avoided.  
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Chapter 4  
Data  
 
 
 
4.1 Data source 
 
To empirically determine the effect of bribery on the performance of Chinese 
firms, this paper uses data from the World Bank Survey 2012. The Enterprise 
Survey is a firm-level survey of a representative sample of an economy’s private 
sector conducted by the World Bank since 1998. The surveys are conducted 
across all geographic regions, industries and small, medium, and large firms.  
The World Bank Survey 2012 is carried out in China between December 
2011 and February 2013. The dataset includes 2700 privately-owned and 148 
state-owned firms. The objective of the survey is to observe firms in the state 
and private sector and to build enterprise data that enables researchers to track 
changes over time allowing them to assess impacts of reforms for instance. The 
survey is conducted through face-to-face interviews with firms operating in dif-
ferent kinds of industries such as manufacturing and service. The dataset covers 
twenty-five cities such as: Beijing, Chengdu City, Dalian City, Dongguan City, 
Foshan City, Guangzhou City, Hangzhou City, Hefei City, Jinan City, Luoyang 
City, Nanjing City, Nantong City, Ningbo City, Qingdao City, Shanghai, Shen-
yang City, Shenzhen City, Shijiazhuang City, Suzhou City, Tangshan City, Wen-
zhou City, Wuhan City, Wuxi City, Yantai City, and Zhengzhou City (World 
Bank, 2013). 
The World Bank contacted 7.24 Chinese enterprises per interview and 
had a rejection rate of 0.55. The World Bank provides two reasons for the rejec-
tion rate. The first reason is the refusal of Chinese enterprises to take part in the 
survey and the second reason is due to the quality of the sample frame. The 
World Bank (2013) applied two strategies to deal with non-responses in the sur-
vey. Enumerators were trained to collect sensitive questions that may lead to a 
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negative reaction from the respondent.3 In case establishments provided incom-
plete information, respondents are re-contacted to complete the information. 
The World Bank maximized their efforts to contact the enterprises that initially 
did not respond. The attempts were conducted at various times and days of the 
week before a substitute Chinese enterprise was approached in order to achieve 
the strata goals (World Bank, 2013).  
 
4.1.1 Reliability of the data  
 
In general, the reliability of datasets that cover China is quite questionable. Da-
tasets that cover China usually suffer from missing information due to the polit-
ical climate and lack of openness. The consequence of missing information is 
that it undermines the representativeness of the sample. Furthermore, in this 
particular dataset, it is not clear who has answered the questions in the survey, 
which raises sessions regarding the validity of the data. A recent article in the 
New York Times also questions the reliability of China’s economic data (Brad-
sher, 2016). The article claims that Chinese data is often manipulated and there-
fore do not represent the reality.  
Moreover, the main focus of this paper is bribery. The payment of bribes 
is a very sensitive topic in China and therefore, people tend to be restricted about 
it as it may lead to severe consequences such as jail time. Hidden information 
may lead to a biased dataset. The questionnaire attempts to deal with this sensi-
tive issue by asking the question regarding informal payments in an implicit man-
ner.  
 
4.2 Description of variables 
 
4.2.1 Dependent variables 
 
Firm performance can be measured by various means, such as growth rates of 
firms’ sales, employment or investments (Dethier et al., 2010). To assess the 
relationship between bribery and firm performance of Chinese firms, the de-
pendent variables of this study are annual sales growth and annual employment 
                                                
3 Enumerators are survey personnel who are responsible for assisting respondents in 
answering questions and completing the questionnaire (OECD, 2001) 
	
	
	
26	
growth. Annual sales growth is measured in percentage by computing the change 
in sales report in 2011 from the previous period 2009. All values for sales will 
remain in the original currency which is yuan. Annual employment growth is 
also measured in percentage by computing the change in full-time employment 
reported in 2011 and the previous period 2009.  
 
Thus, annual sales growth and annual employment growth are used to determine 
firm performance. Figure 5 presents the sales and employment growth rates of 
China in 2012 in comparison with the world and Russia’s growth rates. 
 
Figure 5: Real annual sales growth and annual employment growth in percentage 
 
Source: World Bank Country Highlights (2013) 
 
The real annual sales growth in China between 2009 and 2011 was 5.7 percent. 
This growth rate was more or less the same compared to the world average. 
However, this growth was significantly lower than Russia’s real annual sales 
growth over the same period which was 7.8 percent. Furthermore, China’s an-
nual employment growth over the same period was 9.1 percent which was con-
siderably higher than the world average of 6.4 percent and Russia’s growth rate 
of 5.8 percent. According to calculations of the World Bank (2013), the high 
employment growth and moderate sales growth were associated with declining 
labor productivity.   
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4.2.2 Independent variable 
 
Subsequent to Fisman and Svensson (2007) and Lee and Weng (2013), this paper 
uses the following variable that covers the payment of bribes, namely: “On aver-
age, what percentage of total annual sales, or estimated total annual value, do establishments 
like this one pay in informal payments or gifts to public officials for this purpose?” (World 
Bank, 2012).  
Value 0 indicates that no payments or gifts are paid, and a value of 1 or 
more indicates that a percentage of total annual sales is paid as an informal pay-
ment or gift. This study adds two other proxies to increase the reliability of the 
dataset. The variables are: “the time spent on dealing with regulations by the 
senior management” and “whether the court system is perceived to be fair, im-
partial and uncorrupted”. 
 
4.2.3 Control variables 
 
In order to assess the impact of bribery on firm performance, it is important to 
include control variables that are relevant determinants of firm performance.  
 
Firm age – this variable is considered to be a determinant of firm performance 
due to the fact that new enterprises lack legitimacy and resources compared to 
longer established enterprises. Due to the lack of legitimacy and resources 
younger firms may have a harder time to be profitable (Barron et al., 1994; Choi 
and Shepherd, 2005; Delmar and Shane, 2004; Ranger-Moore, 1997; Wiklund et 
al., 2010; Zimmerman and Zeitz, 2002). This variable is a continuous variable 
that measures firm age in years. 
 
Starting-up unregistered- this variable is deemed to be an important determinant 
as it has a reducing effect on firm performance (La Porta and Shleifer, 2008; 
Perry et al., 2007). This variable is a dummy variable with value 1 signifies that 
the firm started unregistered and 0 indicates that the firm started registered. 
 
Firm size- this variable is also critical because in general, larger firms tend to 
perform better than smaller firms (Hsieh and Olken, 2014). This variable is a 
categorical variable, value 1 indicates small firms with less than 20 employees. 
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Value 2 indicates medium size firms between 20 and 99 employees and value 3 
indicates large firms with more than 100 employees.  
 
Legal status- this variable has a strong association with firm performance it is 
very relevant whether a firm is an open shareholding, a closed shareholding, a 
sole proprietorship, a partnership, a limited partnership, or any other form (Bar-
bera and Moores, 2013). 
 
Ownership structure- apart from the legal status, it is also highly relevant 
whether a firm is owned by private domestic individuals, private foreign individ-
uals or state owned. This factor is interesting especially in China since everything 
is heavily state regulated. This variable will be a dummy variable where value 1 
indicates if the share of the firm’s ownership is held by the state and 0 indicating 
otherwise.  
 
Industry- firm performance differs across industries. Therefore, this variable will 
be included as a categorical variable indicating the various industries 
 
Region- as discussed in chapter 3.3, there seems to be different corruption levels 
and performance growth across the provinces in China. It is interesting to see 
what the influence will be of this variable. 
 
Access to finance- the ability of firms to access financial instruments such as 
bank loans are strongly correlated with firm performance because in absence of 
financial products firms tend to substitute labour for capital (Amaral and Quin-
tin, 2006). This variable will be included as a dummy variable with value 1 signi-
fying whether the firm has access to bank loans and value 0 stating otherwise.   
 
Human capital factors- to assess firm performance key factors such as educa-
tional level and experience are essential. Therefore, six variables will be added to 
account for this determinant, namely: top manager’s experience which is a con-
tinuous variable of the years of experience, temporary workers which measures 
the average number of temporary workers, permanent full-time workers which 
is a continuous variable of the average number of full-time employees, female 
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full-time workers, female ownership which is a dummy variable whereby value 
1 indicates that a woman is the owner and value 0 indicating otherwise and ex-
ternal auditor which is a dummy variable with value 1 signifying that there is an 
external auditor and value 0 indicating otherwise (Black and Lynch 1996). 
 
Level of technological innovation- the level of technological innovation is also 
highly correlated with firm performance, particularly because many consider this 
to be a main reason for the productivity gap between developed and developing 
countries (Farrell, 2004). To assess the effect of this variable, three proxies will 
be added, namely: a quality certification which will be included as a dummy var-
iable with value 1 indicating that the firm has an internationally-recognized qual-
ity certification and the value 0 indicating otherwise.4 The second proxy is the 
presence of a website which will be included as a dummy variable with value 1 
indicating that there is a website that is used for business-related activities and 
value 0 indicating otherwise. Lastly, the use of e-mail will also be included as a 
dummy variable with value 1 indicating that the firm uses e-mail and value 0 
indicating otherwise.  
 
To sum up the following control variables are included: firm age, starting regis-
tration, firm size, legal status, ownership structure, industry, region, access to 
finance, human capital factors and level of technological innovation. 
 
4.2.4 Descriptive statistics 
 
The dataset consists of 2700 observations and 287 variables. After carefully in-
specting the raw data some missing values were discovered. Missing values can 
influence results in a significant way. Therefore, the missing observations will be 
omitted. Furthermore, as this paper aims to analysis a relationship between firm 
performance and bribery, the observations that have the value -9 which indicates 
“don’t know” are also dropped since they do not contribute to the analysis in 
any way. By dropping those values and the missing observations, the final sample 
consists of 1532 observations. 
                                                
4 Such as ISO 9000, 14000 or HACCP. 
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The dependent variables in this study are transformed into logarithms to 
ensure a normal distribution, the next chapter will explain this more in-depth. 
Table 2 presents a summary of the descriptive statistics of all the variables that 
are discussed in the previous chapter.  
 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics 
Variables   Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min      Max 
Annual sales growth 
(log) 
 1531 0.10 0.29 -7.60 4.54 
Annual employment 
growth (log) 
 1531 0.08 0.14 -0.77 1.29 
Informal payments 
in % 
 1532 0.21 1.57 0 30 
State of court sys-
tem 
 1532 2.75 1.57 1 4 
Dealing with gov-
ernment in % 
 1532 1.01 2.69 0 50 
Starting registration 
(0=No 1=Yes) 
 1532 0.95 0.21 0 1 
Firm age  1532 1999.50 7.50 1887 2012 
Firm size  1532 1.89 0.79 1 3 
Ownership 
(0=Other 1=State) 
 1532 0.04 0.21 0 1 
Legal status  1532 3.75 1.08 1 6 
Industry  1532 NA NA NA NA 
Access to finance  1532 0.71 0.85 0 4 
Quality certification 
(0=No 1=Yes) 
 1532 0.59 0.49 0 1 
Use of website 
(0=No 1=Yes) 
 1532 0.69 0.46 0 1 
Use of E-mail 
(0=No 1=Yes) 
 1532 0.85 0.35 0 1 
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Experience top 
manager 
 1532 16.30 7.47 1 50 
Full time employees  1532 209.65 1093.96 5 30000 
Top manager gen-
der 
(0=Male 1=Female) 
  1532 0.56 0.50 0 1 
External auditor 
(0=No 1=Yes) 
 1532 0.70 0.46 0 1 
Transport constraint  1532 0.43 0.71 0 4 
Electricity constraint  1532 0.46 0.72 0 4 
 
 
Chapter 5  
Methodology  
 
 
 
5.1 Empirical methodology and model specification 
 
Within research there are various ways of estimating a regression. The most suit-
able method for this study is a multiple regression method since there are two 
dependent variables. The advantage of such a model is that it is a joint estimator 
and therefore also presents the results of the estimates of the covariance’s be-
tween the equations. The multiple regression analysis uses a similar set of prob-
ability distributions just as the univariate analysis does. This enables the study to 
understand the relationship between bribery and firm performance sufficiently. 
Furthermore, the coefficients and standard errors in a multiple regression anal-
ysis are similar to those that a linear regression produces, if the equations were 
estimated separately (STATA, 2017).  
 
5.2 Defining and measuring corruption 
 
It is rather difficult to define and measure corruption since it can be expressed 
in many forms. As mentioned in chapter 2.2, bribery is considered to be a direct 
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measure of corruption (Fisman and Svensson, 2007). In this paper, bribery is 
defined as the percentage of total annual sales that a firms pays in informal pay-
ments or gifts to public officials. To account for any sensitivity regarding the 
primary topic of interest corruption, the question is asked in an implicit manner 
by the interviewer. Therefore, there could be a possibility that this measurement 
of corruption suffers from falsity and hidden information (Wang and You, 
2012). As described in chapter 4.2, this study accounts for this problem by add-
ing two other proxies to increase the reliability of the dataset namely, “the time 
spent on dealing with regulations by the senior management” and “whether the 
court system is fair, impartial and uncorrupted”.  
It is quite insightful to explore the explanatory variable more in-depth 
before proceeding to the regression analysis. Figure 6 provides a graph wherein 
the distribution of the percentage of informal payments (bribes) is shown.  
 
Figure 6: Distribution of informal payments 
 
 
Figure 6 indicates that the highest percentage of total annual sales paid as an 
informal payment is 30 per cent. The average percentage paid as an informal 
payment is 0.21 per cent which indicated that on average a very small amount is 
spend on informal payments or gifts on Chinese governments. To account for 
the lack of variation in this variable, this study transformed the variable into a 
dummy to generate more variation. However, no significant changes were ob-
served.    
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5.3 Construction of firm performance measurements  
 
In this study, the growth rate of firm sales and employment are employed as 
measurements for firm performance, this is in line with Fisman and Svensson 
(2007). 
The dataset used in this study recorded the sales in fiscal year 2009 and 
2011, this allows the study to calculate annual sales growth. In order to normalize 
the firm’s annual sales, this study includes a logarithm of the variable. The 
change in annual sales is calculated as the difference between the logarithms. 
The annual sales growth of Chinese firms between 2009 and 2011 is calculated 
as follows: 
 
Si= (lh annual sales 2011 – lh annual sales 2009)/2 
 
Furthermore, to normalize the firms’ annual employment growth, a log of the 
variable is included. Employment growth is calculated by the change in full-time 
employment in the current fiscal year from a previous fiscal year. The annual 
employment growth of Chinese firms between 2009 and 2011 is calculated as 
follows: 
Ei= (lh employment 2011 – lh employment 2009)/2 
 
The theory and literature both provide evidence for either positive or negative 
impacts of bribery on firm performance. In order to assess the relationship be-
tween bribery and Chinese firm performance, this study investigates the follow-
ing estimates: 
 
Si = β0 + β1 briberyi + β2 starting registrationi + β3 firm agei + β4 firm sizei + β5 
ownershipi + β6 legal statusi + β7 industryi + β8 regioni + β9 workforcei + β10 major 
constraintsi + β11 innovation and technologyi + ui 
          (1) 
and 
 
	
	
	
34	
Ei = β0 + β1 briberyi + β2 starting registrationi + β3 firm agei + β4 firm sizei + β5 
ownershipi + β6 legal statusi + β7 industry + β8 regioni + β9 workforcei + β10 major 
constraintsi + β11 innovation and technologyi + ui 
          (2) 
 
Both model 1 and 2 include the logged variables of annual sales growth and 
annual employment growth. Si denotes the two-year average growth rate of an-
nuals sales. Ei denotes the two-year average growth of employment. Briberyi is 
the measurement of bribery, which is presented as the percentage of total annual 
sales that a firms pays as informal payments or gifts to Chinese government 
officials. Finally, both estimates include ui which reflects the random error term. 
Dethier et al, (2010) and Xu (201) conducted a comprehensive review 
and conclude that various other factors may also influence firm performance, 
such as firm size, firm age, ownership, workforce, industry, legal status, innova-
tion and technology. Therefore, these variables are also included in the estimate.  
Since the variables are transformed into logarithms, a different method 
of interpretation of the results applies, namely a one-unit increase in x is associ-
ated with an approximate beta per cent change in y. This study uses STATA 
analysis software to conduct the regressions. This study employs two dependent 
variables to measure firm performance, therefore a multiple regression analysis 
is the most appropriate method to estimate the models. By applying this model 
this study can assess the impact of change in the independent variable on the 
dependent variables.  
 
5.4 Econometric obstacles 
 
Problems that often occur when estimating regression models are heteroscedas-
ticity and an abnormality in the residuals. Two important conditions of a regres-
sion model are the assumption of the variance of the error term being constant 
and the disturbance terms not being correlated. When either of these conditions 
are violated, the estimated coefficients are no longer efficient (Gujarati and Por-
ter, 2009). Heteroscedasticity can occur when there are outliers in the observa-
tions or when the model is miss specified. The scatter plots of the residuals of 
the estimated models seem to be nearly normally distributed but it does suffer 
	
	
	
35	
from some outliers. To account for heteroscedasticity, the regression is per-
formed by using White’s robust standard errors. The standard errors are in-
cluded in table 3 between parentheses. This study tested for multicollinearity, by 
applying the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) analysis. The results indicate that 
all of the values are below the threshold of 5, thus collinearity seems not to be a 
problem.  
 
Chapter 6  
Results 
 
 
 
6.1 Correlation analysis 
 
Before testing the estimated models, it is interesting to analyse whether or not 
correlation between bribery and firm performance exists à priori. Table 3 pre-
sents the results of the Pearson correlation coefficients. The coefficients indicate 
that the level of correlation between informal payments made or gifts given and 
annual sales growth is rather weak. The same applies to the level of correlation 
between informal payments made or gifts given and annual employment growth. 
Furthermore, the results also indicate a weak correlation between the other var-
iables and firm performance, except for the correlation between informal pay-
ments or gifts given and whether the court system is fair, impartial and uncor-
rupted, there is a stronger correlation noticeable. The negative correlation indi-
cates that there is a negative relationship between how the court system is per-
ceived and informal payments. This means that as one of the variables increases, 
the other tends to decrease, and vice versa. 
To conclude, based on the Pearson’s correlation analysis it becomes clear 
that there is no strong à priori correlation between bribery and firm perfor-
mance. However, in order to explain the relationship more in-depth, a regression 
analysis is necessary. 
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Table 3: Pearson’s correlation 
 Annual 
sales 
Annual 
Employ-
ment 
Informal 
payments 
Court 
system 
Dealing 
with gov-
ernment 
Annual sales 1.0000     
Annual em-
ployment 
0.115 1.000    
Informal pay-
ments 
0.006 -0.016 1.000   
Court system -0.050 0.020 -0.147 1.000  
Dealing with 
government 
0.061 0.009 0.096 -0.023 1.000 
 
 
6.2 Regression results 
 
The results of the regression analysis of the model specified in chapter 5 are 
presented in table 4. Model 1 represents the results in which the dependent var-
iable is the annual sales growth. Model 2 represents the results in which the de-
pendent variable is the annual employment growth. In both columns the study 
controlled for firm age, starting registration, firm size, legal status, ownership 
structure, industry, access to finance, human capital factors and level of techno-
logical innovation.  
Table 4 model 1 presents the results of the intercept and the slopes for 
annual sales growth. The coefficients in model 1 reveal that a 1 per cent increase 
in bribery is associated with a decrease in firm’ annual sales by 2.5 per cent. 
However, this result is not significant, meaning that this study fails to reject the 
null hypothesis.  
Moreover, time spent dealing with government officials does have a sta-
tistically significant positive relation with annual sales growth. This indicates that 
1 per cent more time spent on dealing with officials is associated with an increase 
in annual sales growth by 0.6 per cent. Thus, this result implies that the more 
time spend with government officials the better the firm performance is. The 
concept of guanxi is clearly noticeable, establishing good relations with govern-
ment officials proves to be beneficial.  
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Chapter 3.3 discusses that firms that are located in the East of China 
have better firm performance as they benefit the well-structured institutions and 
governance. Model 1 statistically shows that all but one city have 12.1, 9.7 and 
18.7 per cent higher growth sales respectively. This result indicates that cities in 
the East have better firm performances, which is in line with You and Nie 
(2017). 
Furthermore, inspecting the results presented in model 2, it becomes 
clear that a 1 per cent increase in bribery is associated with an increase of firms’ 
annual employment by 0.1 percent. However, just as in model 1, the impact of 
bribery on employment growth does not reach a statistically significant level in 
model 2. This means that this study fails to reject the null hypothesis.  
Nevertheless, there seems to be a significant relationship between annual 
employment growth and whether firms find the court system fair, impartial and 
uncorrupted. Firms that disagree, agree and strongly agree all reach a statically 
significant level and are associated with a 6.5, 6.8 and 4.8 per cent increase of 
annual employment growth respectively. This result is interesting since firms 
that perceive the court system to be not fair, partial and corrupted and firms that 
perceive it as non-corrupt, both achieve growth in employment. This might im-
ply that bribery does not contribute negatively to growth at all. 
Moreover, just as in model 1 it seems that the firms located in the East 
of China benefit from their location. The significant results on model 2 indicate 
that firms that operate in the East of China have higher employment growth 
rates i.e. better firm performance. This result is again in line with the findings of 
You and Nie (2017). However, although these results indicate that firms in the 
East benefit from their location and the stronger institutions and governance, it 
does not prove that they are bribing less than firms in the West for instance. 
Further research would be necessary to assess whether or not this is the case. 
Lastly, the R-squared of model 1 is 0.091, this implies that 9.1 per cent 
of the variation in annual sales growth is explained by the variables in the model. 
The R-squared of model 2 is 0.119, meaning that 11.9 per cent of the variation 
in annual employment growth is explained by the variables in the model. 
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Table 4: Multiple regression analysis results 
 Model 1 Sales growth Model 2 Employment 
growth 
Bribery -0.025 (0.052) 0.001 (0.002) 
Court system (RC: 
Strongly disagree) 
  
Tend to disagree  0.002 (0.045) 0.065 (0.020)*** 
Tend to agree -0.024 (0.043) 0.068 (0.020)*** 
Strongly agree -0.072 (0.050) 0.048 (0.023)* 
 
Dealing with regula-
tions 
 
0.006 (0.003)** 
 
0.000 (0.001) 
   
Registration (RC: No)  0.017 (0.037) -0.013 (0.017) 
Firm age -0.049 (0.108) -0.117 (0.049)** 
Firm age (squared)  0.000 (0.000)  0.000 (0.000)** 
Ownership (RC: Other) -0.055 (0.042) -0.009 (0.019) 
   
Firm size (RC: small)   
Medium 0.028 (0.019)  0.001 (0.009) 
Large 0.045 (0.022)** -0.004 (0.010) 
   
Legal status (RC: Share-
holding company with 
traded shares) 
  
Shareholding company 
with non-traded shares 
0.279(0.066)*** -0.054 (0.030)* 
Sole proprietorship 0.271 (0.056)*** -0.026 (0.026) 
Partnership 0.309 (0.060)***  0.025 (0.028) 
Limited partnership 0.289 (0.056)***  0.028 (0.026) 
Other 0.406 (0.078)***  0.019 (0.037) 
   
Industry   
Refined petroleum  0.637 (0.211)***  
Recycling  0.227 (0.110)**  
Construction -0.105 (0.051)**  
   
Region   
Guangzhou City  0.121 (0.053)** 0.072 (0.024)** 
Tangshan City -0.174 (0.056)**  
Jinan City  0.097 (0.050)**  
Shanghai  0.186 (0.091)**  
Foshan  0.044 (0.262)* 
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Shijiazhuang City  0.079 (0.024)*** 
Zhengzhou City  0.067 (0.255)*** 
Luoyang City  0.064 (0.263)** 
Wuhan City  0.060 (0.250)** 
Nanjing City  0.699 (0.270)*** 
Suzhou City  0.074 (0.023)*** 
Nantong City  0.066 (0.026)** 
Shenyang City  0.050 (0.024) ** 
Qingdao City  0.051 (0.027)* 
Hangzhou City  -0.071 (0.033)** 
Ningbo City  0.089 (0.024)*** 
Wenzhou City  0.096 (0.027)*** 
   
Access to finance   
Minor obstacle  0.012 (0.019) 0.013 (0.008) 
Moderate obstacle -0.003 (0.029) 0.025 (0.011)** 
Major obstacle -0.060 (0.045) -0.013 (0.019) 
Very severe obstacle -0.228 (0.100)** -0.067 (0.046) 
   
Transport (RC: No obsta-
cle) 
  
Minor obstacle  0.004 (0.195) -0.004 (0.009) 
Moderate obstacle -0.002 (0.032)  0.034 (0.015) 
Major obstacle  0.020 (0.081) -0.007 (0.037) 
Very severe obstacle  0.000 (0.091)  0.051 (0.042) 
   
Electricity (RC: No ob-
stacle) 
  
Minor obstacle -0.169 (0.018)  0.000 (0.009) 
Moderate obstacle 0.024 (0.029) -0.007 (0.014) 
Major obstacle -0.053 (0.080) -0.069 (0.037)* 
Very severe obstacle 0.053 (0.115) -0.023 (0.053) 
   
Innovation and technology   
Quality certification 
(RC: No) 
0.013 (0.018) 0.018 (0.008)** 
External auditor (RC: 
No) 
-0.016 (0.019) 0.004 (0.008) 
Website (RC: No) -0.002 (0.018) 0.009 (0.008) 
E-mail (RC: No) -0.021 (0.025) 0.010 (0.009) 
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Work force 
Top manager’s experi-
ence 
0.002 (0.001) -0.000 (0.000) 
Permanent full-time 
workers 
2.75e-06 (7.11e-06) 2.63e-06 (3.25e-06) 
Female ownership (RC: 
No) 
0.012 (0.017) 0.011 (0.008) 
   
Constant 48.197 (106.755) 113.676 (48.845)** 
Observations 1531 1531 
Model F test 1.712** 2.326*** 
R-squared 0.091 0.119 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Significance are denoted at *p<0.1, **p<0.05, and 
***p<0.01. Only the significant industries and regions are included in this table. 
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Chapter 7 
Discussion and implications  
 
 
 
This paper started off by formulating a hypothesis assuming that Chinese firm 
performance increases when it engages in bribe payments to Chinese govern-
ment officials. The results do not confirm the à priori expectations that firm 
performance increases due to the payments of “grease money” to government 
officials, controlling for other factors that could possibly influence firm perfor-
mance. However, even though this paper fails to provide significant results, the 
findings are somewhat in line with the theories discussed in this paper. On the 
one hand, it appears that the principals of the “grease the wheel” theory applies 
since there is a positive correlation between bribery and annual employment 
growth. As the “grease the wheels” theory argues, engaging in bribery enables 
firms to overcome bureaucratic obstacles and gain a larger market share which 
benefits their firm performances. On the other hand, the results indicate a neg-
ative correlation coefficient between bribery and firms’ annual sales growth. This 
is in line with the competing theory that argues that engaging in corruption leads 
to a misallocation of resources, inefficiency and thus lower firm performance. 
However, due to insignificance of the results, this study cannot empirically con-
firm this reasoning. But to build on a vast majority of literature that reveals both 
the positive and negative relationship between corruption and firm performance, 
it appears that this study does provide the appropriate framework.  
 Nonetheless, this paper did find a statistically significant positive effect 
between firm performance and dealing with regulations. It seems that firms that 
spend 1 percent more of their time dealing with government officials have higher 
firm performances. This in line with Cai et al., (2011) who argue that firms that 
may require new permits or in other words “need to get things done” spend 
more time on dealing with government officials. Though, this does not prove 
that spending time with government officials is related to illegal practices such 
as bribery, but because China is the primary focus in this paper it does suggest 
that good relations (guanxi) benefit firms’ performances.  
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Furthermore, there is a statically significant positive relationship between 
whether firms perceive the court system to be fair, impartial and uncorrupted 
and firm performances. The results are quite interesting because both firms that 
agree and disagree with this question have positive growth rates. This suggests 
that bribery does not contribute negatively to growth at all. This is interesting 
since a vast majority of literature argues the negative effect corruption has on 
growth. These results contradict literature, making it questionable whether cor-
ruption is as bad on growth as some scholars claim.  
Policy implications of this study are that some firms still perceive the 
court system to be not-fair, partial and corrupted despite China’s efforts to battle 
corruption. A way of dealing with corrupted officials apart from jail time is to 
reduce incentives for corruption by increasing the wages for public officials. This 
way government officials could be less tempted to engage in corruption. An-
other implication is that the Chinese government primary focuses on corrupted 
government officials in its “catching tigers and flies” reforms, but it should also 
focus on the firms that offer the bribes. As discussed in the theory, bribery in-
volves an illegitimate transaction between government officials and other actors. 
Drawing upon the Neo-classical theory, firms are rational actors that rationally 
make the decision whether to bribe or not based on a benefit-cost analysis (Al-
lingham and Sandmo, 1972; Becker, 1968). Therefore, to change the cost-benefit 
ratio, the Chinese government needs to increase the risks and sanctions in order 
to make bribing an irrational choice. However, the existence of weak formal 
institutions in China may prevent this approach of succeeding. China reached a 
well-developed phase in their economy, but in order for China to sustain their 
economic growth, the establishment of strong institutions is necessary. By build-
ing strong institutions, corruption becomes less present. 
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Chapter 8  
Conclusion 
 
 
Corruption is widely viewed as the pervasive cause of poor economic perfor-
mance. It is especially believed that countries with weak institutions suffer the 
most from corruption. Some scholars argue that corruption is a necessary evil 
that enables firms to mitigate the negative effects of inefficient bureaucracy. By 
bribing government officials, firms believe their company will benefit and 
achieve higher growth rates. Others argue that corruption has a negative inter-
fering impact on firm performance due to rent seeking, misallocation of re-
sources, and inefficient investments. 
Nevertheless, not all developing countries suffer from corruption. 
China, as the striking example of the “East Asian paradox”, seems to prove oth-
erwise with its extraordinary economic growth rates over the past decades de-
spite high levels of corruption. Based on this puzzle, the overall aim of this paper 
has been to investigate the relationship between corruption and firm perfor-
mance of Chinese firms.  
This paper used firm-level data collected by the World Bank to empiri-
cally test whether Chinese firms who engage in bribery have higher firm perfor-
mances. The results of the econometric analysis were not able to statistically 
confirm a relationship between corruption and Chinese firm performance. A 
possible explanation of this result could be that the way guanxi is anchored in 
the Chinese (business) culture suggests that Chinese businesses do not recognize 
corruption so much and therefore fits nicely within their business practices and 
as a result does not obstruct growth.  
Furthermore, this paper did find a significant positive relationship be-
tween whether firms perceive the court system to be fair, impartial and uncor-
rupted and firm performances. Firms that tend to disagree and agree both 
achieve higher levels of firm performance. This suggests that bribery does not 
contribute negatively to growth at all of Chinese firms. This paper did also find 
a significant relationship between firm performance and dealing with regula-
tions, which indicates that spending more time with the government results in 
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higher levels of firm performance and emphasises again on the deeply rooted 
Chinese cultural phenomenon of guanxi.  
The main limitation of this paper is the availability of empirical data. 
Only one questionnaire is used to construct the dependent and independent var-
iables. In addition, as discussed in chapter 5, the reliability of Chinese data is 
ambiguous and therefore may lead to crooked results. Although the interviewer 
tried to account for the sensitivity of the subject and therefore asked the re-
spondents about their firms’ engagement in bribery in an implicit manner, this 
study cannot ensure no source bias. Employing a data set that covers more firms 
and includes variables that cover “corruption” and “bribery” to a greater extent 
would embellish the results immensely. Lastly, reverse causality could be a po-
tential limitation too. There is a possibility that not only does bribery cause sales 
growth or employment growth, but also that sales and employment growth cause 
bribery. Reversed causality leads to endogeneity, which means that the regres-
sion produces biased and inconsistent estimates of the parameters.  
The aforementioned limitations offer potential for future research. It 
would be interesting to see what the effect is of China’s institutions on growth. 
Sustainable growth requires well-functioning institutions. Since this paper only 
controlled for firm-related factors, future research is necessary to account for 
institutional effects. Moreover, this paper discovered that firms in the East have 
higher levels of firm growth. However, this paper did not provide any evidence 
whether or not that firm growth is related to bribery. Therefore, further research 
is necessary to assess whether or not this is the case. 
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